Intelligence And Government
We all suspected intelligence abuses and distortions during the Bush administration’s run-up to the Iraq war, but an amazing piece new by a former CIA executive describes exactly how and what happened. This is the current feature in Foreign Affairs magazine (available on their website, foreignaffairs.org). The detailed essay by Paul R. Pillar, who was ultimately in charge of Middle East intelligence during 2000-2005, does not mince words in its criticism of the Bush administration’s “abuses.” I find it quite remarkable how closely this senior spook echoes dissenting positions that were labeled radical at the time.
If the entire body of official intelligence analysis on Iraq had a policy implication, it was to avoid war — or, if war was going to be launched, to prepare for a messy aftermath. What is most remarkable about prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq is not that it got things wrong and thereby misled policymakers; it is that it played so small a role in one of the most important U.S. policy decisions in recent decades.
Incredibly, the White House didn’t actually consult the CIA at all before going to war. Congress requested an assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs in October 2002, but
As the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war.
Even more interesting is that the CIA in fact agreed with the dissenting elements of the American public that the Al-Qaeda/Hussein link was bullshit:
But the greatest discrepancy between the administration’s public statements and the intelligence community’s judgments concerned not WMD (there was indeed a broad consensus that such programs existed), but the relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda. The enormous attention devoted to this subject did not reflect any judgment by intelligence officials that there was or was likely to be anything like the “alliance” the administration said existed. The reason the connection got so much attention was that the administration wanted to hitch the Iraq expedition to the “war on terror” and the threat the American public feared most, thereby capitalizing on the country’s militant post-9/11 mood.
The article itself is uber-intellectual, serious political science stuff. It may be important in a historical sense as documentation that, yes, the Bush regime did have preconceived notions about the necessity for war. It’s certainly among the most damning evidence we’ve yet seen. But as a process geek, what is most fascinating to me is the excellent discussion of the proper relationship between intelligence and policy making that follows.
This process represented a radical departure from the textbook model of the relationship between intelligence and policy, in which an intelligence service responds to policymaker interest in certain subjects (such as “security threats from Iraq” or “al Qaeda’s supporters”) and explores them in whatever direction the evidence leads.
The Iraq case needs further examination and reflection on its own. But public discussion of how to foster a better relationship between intelligence officials and policymakers and how to ensure better use of intelligence on future issues is also necessary.
Intelligence affects the nation’s interests through its effect on policy. No matter how much the process of intelligence gathering itself is fixed, the changes will do no good if the role of intelligence in the policymaking process is not also addressed. On this point, the United States should emulate the United Kingdom, where discussion of this issue has been more forthright, by declaring once and for all that its intelligence services should not be part of public advocacy of policies still under debate.
This line of reasoning is, I am sure, old news to any seasoned PolSci grad. It was new to me, and I suspect that it is an aspect of societal organization that is relatively obscure to the pubic at large. Which is too bad, because I am beginning to suspect that this relationship between intelligence and policy matters deeply in big decisions, e.g. going to war. The author then goes on to suggest specific changes in government power structure, such as placing intelligence functions into a separate organization within which the president cannot control appointments, similar to the quasi-autonomous Federal Reserve. The details and historical justification make a fascinating read.
In other words, Pillar has not only stated the problem, he has analyzed in detail how it happened, and suggested ways in which this could be avoided in the future, ways that are far more likely to work than simply hoping the president is honest.
Remember: civilization is an ongoing experiment.
